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THE FEDERAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION RIGHTS OF NON-INDIAN CIVIL
LITIGANTS IN TRIBAL COURTS AFTER SANTA
CLARA PUEBLO V. MARTINEZ
GREGORY SCHULTZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Indian tribal courts can and do exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians in reservation related civil matters. ' Tribal courts and governments,
however, unlike the state and federal governments, are not subject to
federal constitutional restraints. 2 As a result, until 1968 non-Indians
and Indians alike suffered in tribal courts and before tribal councils what
would have amounted to, in state and federal courts, denials of due process and equal protection of the laws. 3 Wishing to change this situation,
Congress in 1968 passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, which provides,
among other things, that "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment shall ... (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process of law."'4 The Act on its face furnishes no remedy
by which to enforce the rights granted therein, other than habeas corpus
relief.5 Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court decided Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez,6 most federal courts hearing claims under the Act
found an implied right of action and granted injunctive or declaratory
7
relief accordingly.
In Santa Clara, however, which concerned an equal protection challenge by an Indian against her tribe and its governor, the Supreme
Court held that the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit barred suits
against the tribe under the Act, except those pursuant to the habeas
writ.8 The Court also held that the Act did not impliedly authorize a
private cause of action for declaratory or injunctive relief against tribal
officials. 9 The decision, therefore, resulted in an Act which provides
rights but no remedy, other than the habeas writ or an action under the
* J.D., 1984, Northwestern School of Law. The author is an Associate with Brown
& Bain, Phoenix, Arizona.
1. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See generaly Canby, Civil Jurisdictionand
the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH. L. REv. 206.
2. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-58 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376 (1896).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
6. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
7. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
8. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 58-59 (1978).
9. Id at 72.
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Act in the tribal court itself, to preserve such rights. The habeas writ
protects only against takings of liberty, not property, without due process, and so is of no use in civil litigation. Nor, as cases decided under
the Act indicate, 10 do the tribal courts always enforce the rights granted
by the Act against themselves or against those tribal councils which elect
tribal judges. As a result, since Santa Clara, non-Indians and Indians
involved in civil litigation in the tribal courts have had no effective relief,
federal or tribal, from deprivation of due process or equal protection of
the laws.
This situation is undesirable for non-Indians and Indians involved
in civil litigation in the tribal courts, and ultimately for the tribes themselves. Non-Indians have hesitated to invest capital on the reservations,
or to do business with Indians in general without an ultimate safeguard
of state or federal relief. They are reluctant to face the possible deprivation of their property without due process by the tribal courts or councils. I The fact that the tribal courts themselves are now supposed to
preserve the rights granted under the Act, but cannot be held by federal
courts to do so, means no guarantee of due process or equal protection
exists. 12 The result of this fear of tribal courts by non-Indians is a denial
to the tribes of private investment capital and, consequently, perpetuates the tribes' economic dependence on federal outlays. 13 Such dependence conflicts with the federal objective, recognized by the Santa Clara
14
Court, of fostering tribal autonomy and self-government.
Various solutions to the problem present themselves. First, the
Santa Clara opinion could be read narrowly, as denying a federal remedy
other than habeas corpus only to Indians, not to non-Indians, and only
in situations involving intratribal disputes. This solution, however, incongruously entails interpreting an act which was predominantly intended to provide Indians with constitutional-type rights against their
governments' 5 as providing only non-Indians with federal remedies to
10. See, e.g., Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 677 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 907 (1982); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981); RJ. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous.
Auth., 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981), rev'd, 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985).
11. See Schwechten, Epilogue: In Spite of the Lau--A Social Comment on the Impact of Kennerly and Crow Tribe, 33 MoNT. L. REV. 317 (1972); Comment, Jurisdiction and the Indian
Credit Problem: Considerationsfor a Solution, 33 MoNT. L. REV. 307 (1972).
12. See supra note 10.
13.

See AMERICAN INDIAN PoLicy REVIEW CoMM'N, FINAL REPORT 307 (1977) [hereinaf-

ter cited as AIPRC]. The American Indian Policy Review Commission was established
pursuant to Pub. L. No. 93-580, 88 Stat. 1910 (1975) (as amended by Pub. L. 94-80, 89
Stat. 415, 416 (1975)) and was a bipartisan body charged with reviewing the historical and
legal basis of the Indian relationship with the federal government, and with reporting its
recommendations to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, who were
in turn to refer the report to standing committees to consider the enactment of recommended legislation.
14. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62-65. See also Message from President Nixon to Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 363,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 116 CONG. REC. 23258 (1970) (the goal
of national Indian policy is "to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.").
15. See S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967).
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enforce the same rights. The more logical reading of Santa Clarais that
the opinion is applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. In this case,
the solution to the problem of remedy for Indians and non-Indians
should be a congressional amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act,
permitting appeal by both Lxadians and non-Indians to a federal district
court from a tribal court if the appellant can demonstrate a prima fade
denial of the rights enumerated in the Act. The appellant should also
have to demonstrate, in his petition for appellate review, an exhaustion
16
of tribal appeals.
The Act, if amended as proposed, would intrude only minimally on
the federal policy, recognized by the Santa Clara Court, of protecting
tribal sovereignty and self-government. 17 The amended Act would also
be consistent with the predominant legislative intent which was to provide some constitutional-type rights to all who find themselves before
tribal courts or councils.' 8 The proposed appellate solution is more
consistent with the modern status of federal Indian law, including the
Indian Civil Rights Act itself, than is the Santa Clara Court's decision that
tribal sovereignty and autonomy bar injunctive and declaratory relief
under the Act.
The focus of this article is the plight of non-Indians in tribal courts.
Accordingly, Section II describes the erosion of tribal sovereignty in
matters involving non-Indians, showing that the sovereignty doctrine no
longer serves as a legal impediment to review of tribal court opinions by
federal appellate courts. The great degree of federal control over the
Indian reservation is also examined. Section III presents a description
of those features of tribal court litigation which would amount to denials
of due process in state and federal courts. The tribal courts' inability to
prevent equal protection violations by tribal councils is also examined,
followed by a consideration of the extent to which the tribal courts are
dependent upon federal funding and dominated by federal regulation.
Section IV examines the Act itself, its legislative history, the Santa Clara
opinion, and the negative responses to Santa Clara by federal courts. A
proposal is offered in Section V to amend the Act to permit federal appellate review of tribal court decisions which involve prima facie violations of the rights provided by the Act. Finally, the paper closes with a
brief examination of the economic benefits which would accrue to the
tribes if the amended Act causes an increased willingness on the part of
non-Indian investors to invest capital on the reservations.
16.
review
17.
18.

The American Indian Policy Review Commission also suggested such appellate
in its FINAL REPORT, AIPRC, supra note 13, at 19.
Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62-65.
E.g., Hearingson the ConstitutionalRights of the American Indian, S. 961-68 and S.J. Res.

40, Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1965). See also supra note 15.
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THE LEGAL STATUS OF INDIAN TRIBES

Tribal Sovereignty

The legal status of Indian tribes is unique in the American legal
system. It is best described as "dependent sovereignty." The sovereignty is inherent because the tribes were once completely independent
nations, separate from and pre-dating our own government,1 9 and they
gave up their complete sovereignty only by conquest and treaties. The
tribes are now unique political aggregations, retaining certain attributes
of their inherent sovereignty which pertain to their members and their
territory. 20 The first significant federal Indian decision was Worcester v.
Georgia, in which Mr. Chief Justice Marshall described the Indian nation
as
a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries ... in which the laws [of the states] can have no force, but
... in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our Constitution
and laws, vested in the government
2
of the United States. '
Today the retained inherent sovereignty of tribes includes the power to
establish governments and courts, and to pass laws to govern the con22
duct of their members.
The inherent sovereignty of the tribes, however, is subject to the
sovereignty of the United States. The tribes exist within the geographical limitations of the United States, and it has been established that Indian title to the lands on which they live is "only a right of occupancy...
extinguishable only by the United States."' 23 Congress has plenary authority to make laws concerning the Indian tribes.2 4 This power derives
from Congress' constitutional responsibility for regulating commerce
25
with the tribes and for treatymaking.
Tribal sovereignty as it exists today, thus, the product of an inherent sovereign's incorporation within the territory of a greater sovereign,
the United States. This incorporation has entailed a loss, by treaty and
federal statute, of some aspects of the sovereignty which the tribes previ19. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959).
20. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
21. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
22. See, e.g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
23. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974). See also
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
24. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978).
25. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973). See U.S.'
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3; art. 11, § 2, cl.2. The power over the tribes has also been held to
derive from the necessity of giving protection to a dependent people. See, e.g., Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 n.4 (1959). Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall, calling the tribes
"domestic dependent nations," likened the relation of the United States to the tribes to
that of a ward to his guardian. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
This wardship theory, at least as a source of federal power over the Indian, has lost favor.
But cf. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 4-6.
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ously enjoyed.2 6 Tribal sovereignty is of a limited character, subject to
complete defeasance by Congress, but to be retained until Congress so
acts.
The tribes now possess only those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or "by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status."'2 7 Such implicit divestiture by virtue of the
tribes' dependent status occurs where the exercise of tribal sovereignty
is inconsistent with overriding federal interests. 2 8 Divestiture of sovereignty is therefore the result in those cases involving the relations between an Indian tribe and non-members of the tribe, usually nonIndians. 29 The exercise, therefore, of tribal power beyond that of selfgovernment and the control of internal relations is inconsistent with the
30
tribes' dependent status.
It follows from the limited nature of tribal sovereignty that if Congress decided that there was a federal interest in endowing non-Indians
with constitutional-type rights in the tribal courts, then tribal sovereignty should be no bar to the federal enforcement of such rights. Relations between non-Indians and the tribes do not concern strictly internal
tribal matters. As such, the implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty that
results when the tribes interact with non-Indians would allow the federal
courts to intrude on tribal government at least to the extent of permitting a federal appeal from certain tribal court decisions.
B.

Federal Control of Tribal Government

In addition to limited sovereignty, another unique feature of the
present legal status of the tribes is the extent of federal control of tribal
governments. Because of retained inherent tribal sovereignty, tribal
self-government is not an exercise of delegated federal power; that is,
tribal governments are not federal agencies.3 1 The exercise of tribal
26. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
27. Id
28. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980) (observing that federal law "has not worked a divestiture of
Indian taxing power").
29. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
30. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). See also Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 n.4 (1959);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886). The implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty by reason of the tribes' dependent status sometimes occurs when the Court is
concerned for the states' legitimate interest in regulating the affairs of non-Indians. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973). The test for when the
states' interest divests tribal sovereignty is laid down in Williams, 358 U.S. at 219-20:
Over the years this Court has modified [the Worcester principle] in cases where
essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would
not bejeopardized.... Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
In short, a state can assert jurisdiction over non-Indians on a reservation, at the expense of
tribal sovereignty, only if it can do so without weakening tribal self-government.
31. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326-28. See also AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM,
INDIAN SELF DETERMINATION AND THE ROLE OF TRIBAL COURTS, at 20 (1977) [hereinafter

cited as "AILTP"].
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self-government 3 2 does remain subject to ultimate federal control, but
federal regulations do not create the Indians' power to govern themselves.3 3 "That Congress has in certain ways regulated the manner and
extent of the tribal power of self-government does not mean that Congress is the source of that power."'3 4 In accordance with the notion that
tribal courts and governments are not, as a matter of law, federal agencies or instrumentalities, the Supreme Court has held that they are not
35
subject to the Constitution.
The current federal policy objective of fostering tribal self-government is not inconsistent with the legal doctrine that the source of power
behind tribal self-government is tribal, not federal, sovereignty. 3 6 As a
matter of legal history, however, federal attempts to foster tribal government have always taken the form of deep intrusions into tribal life and
organization.3 7 This intrusion continues today, as federal regulations
38
dictate the form and even the existence of some tribal governments.
Federal Indian policy has vacillated between the extremes of assimilating the Indians into white society and preserving tribal autonomy and
self-government. The former policy has been dominant historically.
Following the range wars, which ended in the 1870s and subjected most
tribes to military rule, Congress passed the Indian General Allotment
(Dawes) Act.3 9 The Act attempted to "civilize" the Indian population by
dissolving tribal relations. 40 This was to be accomplished by the destruction of tribal governments, then still in the form of the authority of
chiefs and elders. 4 1 The Act provided for farm-sized allotments to each
tribal Indian, and was designed to transfer ownership of reservation
land to individual Indians in fee after a period of ownership in trust and
thereby to extend state jurisdiction to the Indians and their lands. Tribal land beyond that needed for the allotments was opened to non-Indi32. There are some 287 tribal governments within the United States. AIPRC, supra
note 13, at 5 (1977). As of 1977, a total of 289 tribes and bands lived on 268 "federally
recognized" reservations or otherwise defined "trust areas" in 26 states. Id at 90.
33. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328. As examples of the federal regulation of tribal governments the Wheeler Court lists, first, the Code of Indian Tribal Offenses and the Courts of
Indian Offenses, both products of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, noting:
Such Courts of Indian Offenses, or "CFR Courts," still exist on approximately 30
reservations "in which traditional agencies for the enforcement of tribal law and
custom have broken down [and] no adequate substitute has been provided." 25
C.F.R. § 11.l(b) (1977). We need not decide today whether such a court is an
arm of the Federal Government ....
Id at 327 n.26. As further examples of federal regulation, the Court mentioned the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982), and the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). Id. at 327.
34. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328.
35. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896).
36. See Message from President Nixon to Congress, supra note 14; AIPRC, supra note
13, at 154 (1977). For an example of a recent United States Supreme Court decision
relying heavily on this policy for a rationale, see Santa Clara, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
37. See Canby, supra note 1, at 206-11.
38. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
39. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 381 (1982).
40. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9 (1981).
41. Id
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ans. 42 Concurrent to the allotment process, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
promulgated administrative rules and devices, such as the Courts of In43
dian Offenses, designed to efface the tribal way of life.
The assimilationist approach eventually resulted in non-Indian acquisition of most of the Indian land. As a result, Congress in 1936
adopted the Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, 4 4 which remains the predominant federal legislative device for fostering tribal selfgovernment. This Act ended the allotment practice, provided for the
organization of tribal governments under written constitutions, and was
generally intended to preserve Indian government and the Indian land
base. 4 5 Indian tribes, today, however, regard the Act as an obstacle to
their assertion of self-government because of the power the Act bestows
46
upon the Secretary of the Interior to veto tribal governmental actions.
The Indian Reorganization Act, under which the majority of tribes
today have formed their governments, 4 7 has, in effect, permitted the
Secretary of the Interior to mold tribal governments in the form he has
desired. The Act provides that the tribes can organize and adopt "an
appropriate constitution and bylaws" which become effective after a tribal election "called by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe." 4 8 However, the constitution, bylaws
and amendments are subject to the approval of the Secretary. 4 9 The
tribe's choice of a lawyer, under the Act, is also subject to secretarial
approval. 50 More significantly, much of the present authority of the Secretary to pass upon the validity of tribal laws stems from the particular
constitutions which the tribes adopted under the Act. These constitutions are modeled after a constitution drafted by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs after the passage of the Act, and provide that enactments of the
tribe are not effective until such laws have been approved by the Secretary. 5 ' This review process has hindered tribes in their efforts to assert
their inherent sovereignty within the reservation "through the simple
expedient of a Secretarial veto of tribal ordinances which he conceives
as being beyond the power of a tribe."152 Aside from reviewing tribal
42. Canby, supra note 1, at 210.
43. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 148. However, note that a 1935 opinion of the Secretary
of the Interior concerning the authority of the Secretary to issue rules and regulations
applicable in the Courts of Indian Offenses begins with the admission that there is no
federal statute which vests the Secretary with authority to "govern the conduct of Indians
on the reservation or to promote law and order thereon in anyway at all." Solicitor's
Opinion of Feb. 28, 1935 (unpublished), entitled "Secretary's Power to Regulate Conduct
of Indians," quoted in AIPRC, at 149-50.
44. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982).
45. See, Canby, supra note 1, at 210. Section 461 of the Act ended the allotment process, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1982), and § 462 extended the federal trusteeship of those lands
which had not been allotted.
46. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 188.
47. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1978).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982).
49. Id
50. Id.
51. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 188.
52. Id. For example, the efforts of the Colville Tribe to impose a water use code
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ordinances, the Secretary has also on occasion revoked outright the con53
stitutions of tribes that had not organized under the Act.
Thus, despite a stated federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty
and fostering tribal self-government, tribal governments and tribal law
have often taken the form desired by the Secretary of the Interior and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to which the Secretary can delegate his
power and duties. Indeed, the American Indian Policy Review Commission, in 1977, came to the conclusion that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
has acted directly to undermine tribal self-government.54 A final contradiction of the present federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty and
of minimizing intrusions into tribal self-government is that tribal government, including the tribal courts, is predominantly federallyfunded. 5 5
In sum, although tribal governments and courts are the product of
tribal sovereignty and have been held not to be subject to the Constitution, 5 6 they are molded and controlled by the Secretary of the Interior
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs and are financially supported by federal
outlays. One may therefore ask, especially in view of the truly limited
nature of tribal sovereignty discussed above, whether anyone, particularly non-Indians, should ever suffer denial of due process and equal
protection of the laws by these defacto federal instrumentalities. If the
response is no, and if the tribes, as a matter of Supreme Court decisions,
are destined to remain free of the strictures of the Constitution, then a
practical solution to the conflict between the status of tribal government
in law and in fact would be to hold tribal governments and courts to the
statutorily-bestowed constitutional-type restrictions of the Indian Civil
Rights Act as a means of an effective federal remedy.
III.

TRIBAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

This section describes denials of due process and equal protection
by tribal courts and councils. The Supreme Court has held that tribal
courts themselves should enforce the constitutional-type rights granted
by the Indian Civil Rights Act. 57 The tribal courts, however, sometimes
within the boundaries of their reservation were thwarted by the refusal of the Secretary to
approve their proposed code. The Commission has recommended that section 476 of the
Act be amended to permit Secretarial review only of tribal ordinances which conflict with
the federal trust responsibility over tribal natural resource assets. Id at 15.
53. Id at 189. For his authority to revoke the Secretary has invoked 25 U.S.C. § 2
(1982), which vests in the Secretary "the management of all Indian Affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations." Id The Secretary can delegate his powers and duties
to the branches and divisions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 25 U.S.C. § I(a) (1982).
54. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 189. The Commission has compiled an extensive catalog
of instances of such undermining of tribal government. The catalog consists chiefly of
examples of failure to aid the tribes in their attempts at self-government.
55. Id. at 222-23. See also AILTP, supra note 31, at 58.
56. See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 56; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978);
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). The tribes are probably subject to the thirteenth
amendment, which limits the private action of owning slaves. See In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327
(D. Alaska 1886).
57. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 65.
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can neither remedy equal protection violations by the councils, which
control the judges' jobs, 5 8 nor remedy their own due process violations,
as revealed by the claims against such courts brought subsequent to the
59
Santa Clara decision.
Indian tribes are not required to establish distinct, equal branches
of government to provide for a separation of powers. Rather, tribal
courts are considered subordinate to the tribal council on about onehalf of the reservations. 60 As a result, the councils try to influence court
decisions when they desire a particular outcome. 61 Tribal council control of tribal courts, on most reservations, includes the power to select
judges and to decide the length of their tenure in office. 62 Terms in
office are short, and the judge who desires reappointment faces frequent
pressure to placate the appointing council. 63 Impeachments and recalls
of judges are frequent, and when the recall can be effected by a simple
majority vote of the council, the judge is particularly susceptible to removal if he makes an unpopular decision. 64
Tribal court judges are almost always Indians and non-lawyers. Few
Indian judges have had any legal education other than that received in
attendance at National American Indian Court Judges Association seminars. These seminars provide training only in criminal law. 6 5 Although
the judges' lack of legal education obviously makes non-Indian litigants
anxious about mistaken rulings of laws, this lack of formal legal training
is irrelevant to resolving intratribal disputes in the Indians' traditional,
more informal manner. Members of the tribe have few procedural due
process expectations and are often content to submit to the authority of
an elder, such as a judge, out of court. 66 Litigants, including non-Indians, in tribal courts find themselves under pressure from the bench to
settle, rather than to stand firm on legal positions. 6 7 Even while the
matter is pending before the court, Indian judges often try to settle dis58. See infra notes 60-64. See also note 162 and accompanying text, discussing Dry
Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980) (nonIndian plaintiffs denied access to tribal court, to make an equal protection claim against
the tribal council, by the council itself), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
59. See generally AILTP, supra note 31, at 24-29. See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
60. AILTP, supra note 31, at 86.
61. Id. at 39.
62. Canby, supra note 1, at 216. See, e.g., SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE, ARIz., REV. LAW
AND ORDER CODE 1.6 (1956).

63. AILTP, supra note 3 1, at 94.
64. id at 40-41.
65. Id at 53. Federal regulations require only that a tribal judge be a member of the
tribe served by the court, never have been convicted of a felony, and not have been convicted of a misdemeanor within the preceding year.
66. Traditional tribal justice tended to be more informal and consensual than adjudicative and emphasized restitution rather than punishment. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332
n.34. The AIPRC described traditional tribal justice as follows:
Indian tribes and societies generally did not consider private property as central
to a government's relationship to citizens: communal property concepts are far
more prevalent in tribal societies than are individual property concepts. Because
of this, theft within tribes was "virtually unknown."
AIPRC,supra note 13, at 161.
67. Canby, supra note 1, at 217. "Tribal judges are more likely to encourage full
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putes outside of the courtroom. 68 The judge is usually acquainted with
the Indian parties and, as a result, ex parte contacts and attempts to influence the judge are pervasive, 69 often made by the litigants' families
while trying to explain the circumstances of the particular case. 70 NonIndians who are strangers on the reservation can be at a disadvantage.
A non-Indian party feels the effects of the judge's lack of legal training more than Indian parties do in intratribal disputes because tribal
judges apply federal regulations or state law in litigation involving nonIndians. Most tribal codes are modelled after the Code of Indian Tribal
Offenses, which was published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs after the
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. 7 1 Although a few tribes have
expanded upon the Code 7 2 and those tribes organized under the Act
can adopt their own code, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, few have done so. 73 Thus, in some cases involving non-Indians, tribal judges administer an antiquated federal code. 74 Furthermore, some tribal council decisions are not incorporated into the code
being used by the tribe, with the result that the decisions are unknown
75
by the judge who must interpret them in future cases.
In much civil litigation with non-Indian parties, tribal courts apply
the law of the state in which the reservation is situated, a body of law
with which the courts are even less familiar than federal regulations.
Tribal use of state law is authorized by the Code of Indian Tribal Offenses itself, which requires the tribal courts to apply: (1) federal regulations, and ordinances or customs of the tribe not prohibited by federal
law; and (2) in matters not covered by federal law, the law of the state
"in which the matter in dispute may lie." 76 Thus, in tort and contract
cases, for which there are no applicable federal regulations or tribal customs, state law is applied. 7 7 For example, most tribes apply state traffic
laws to reservation motorists, many of whom are often non-Indians just
passing through Indian country. 78 The non-Indian in tribal court,
agreement among the parties through open-court negotiations then to decide that one
party should win and the other lose." Id. at 218.
68. AILTP, supra note 31, at 67.
69. Id. at 69.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., PAPAGO TRIBE, ARIZ. LAW AND ORDER CODE (1937); WHITE MOUNTAIN
APACHE TRIBE, ARIZ. LAW AND ORDER CODE (1938). See generally, Canby, supra note 1, at
216; AILTP, supra note 31, at 38. The Code of Indian Tribal Offenses was adopted at 22
Fed. Reg. 10,515 (1957) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11).
72. AILTP, supra note 31, at 38.
73. "The Navajo Code... resembles state law more than federal regulations. NAVAJO
TRIBAL CODE (1969). The Hopi Tribe adopted a new tribal code in 1972. The Salt RiverPima Maricopa Indian Community, the Gila River-Maricopa Indian Community, the White
Mountain Apache Tribe ... all have code revision projects under way." Canby, supra note
1, at 216.
74. AILTP, supra note 31, at 97.
75. Id. "Sometimes the first the court hears of a change in existing law is when a
defendant calls it to the court's attention." Id at 38.
76. 25 C.F.R. § 11.23 (1984).
77. Canby, supra note 1, at 216.
78. AILTP, supra note 31, at 85. The next most frequently applied state laws on reservations are probate laws. Id
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therefore, will be reasonably able to anticipate the body of substantive
law that the tribal court will apply in his case.
He may, however, have little idea what to expect procedurally.
Tribes use elements of federal, state, and National American Indian
Court Judges Association (NAICJA) rules of civil procedure, 79 and use
them irregularly. 80 Hearings and motions are not commonly used in
tribal courts. 8 1 Few reservations have rules of evidence in their codes,
and most rely on a mixture of federal, state, and NAICJA rules. 8 2 These
rules, too, are followed loosely: hearsay is admissible, and expert witnesses, are rarely used. 83 Few tribal courts permit jury trials in civil
from the tribal
cases, 84 and in those that do, jurors are selected 8 only
5
rolls and the selection is not subject to challenge.
A final point about trial procedure in tribal courts is the scarcity,
and in some instances, the exclusion from the court, of licensed attornies. 86 The tribal equivalent of an attorney is the "lay advocate," a
non-lawyer who may or may not have had litigation experience. 8 7 Lay
advocates generally represent Indian defendants while licensed attorneys represent most non-Indians in tribal courts. Because most of the
licensed attorneys themselves are non-Indians, 88 there is a significant
risk of alienating or intimidating the tribal judge. This is particularly
true when the tribe itself is involved in the case and represented by a
tribal attorney who has ex parte access to the judge. 89
If a tribal court litigant suffers even a blatant deprivation of due
process, or if a tribal court fails to remedy an equal protection violation
by the tribal council, and the litigant therefore desires to appeal, he may
be further and fatally hindered by the lack of a transcript of the trial
court proceedings and the absence of an appellate court. Few tribal
courts are "courts of record," utilizing a clerk and a seal and regularly
recording their proceedings and decisions. 90 When records of proceedings are kept, the quality is often poor, and they are not transcribed until
after counsel decides to appeal. 9 ' Even more troubling is that no tribal
trial courts render written decisions, and that only a few do even at the
92
appellate level.
AILTP, supra note 31, at 44.
Id. at 68.
Id at 62.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id at 72.
Id. at 73. See also Recent Developments, 46 WASH. L. REV. 541, 545 (1971); Clinton,
CiminalJurisdictionOver Indian Lands: A Journey Through a jurisdictionMaze, 18 ARIz. L. REV.
503, 561 (1976).
86. Canby, supra note 1, at 218.
87. Id
88. AILTP, supra note 31, at 64.
89. Id at 55. "On one reservation the tribal attorney/prosecutor also gives the judge
legal advice and obtains a 90% conviction rate in court."
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id at 68. Some tribes now use a tape recorder or a shorthand clerk to record
proceedings. Id
92. Id at 69.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
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Tribal appellate systems vary greatly. On many reservations there
is simply no appellate system. 93 Where tribes utilize CFR Courts, an
94
administrative appeal may be taken to the Department of the Interior.
Many appellate systems do not function because of a lack of funding or
because tribal members, unfamiliar with the idea of appeal as a right, do
not understand the courts to be an available remedy. 9 5 Of the Indian
appellate courts that do operate regularly, such as those of the Navajo
and the Oglala Sioux, the courts typically allow for review only on the
trial court record, which often is incomplete, although on occasion they
96
will hear oral argument and accept newly discovered evidence.
In sum, the litigant, whether Indian or non-Indian, who ventures
into tribal court on a civil matter faces a strong possibility of a denial of
due process. Furthermore, as indicated by challenges to tribal council
decisions filed under the Indian Civil Rights Act, tribal courts sometimes
fail to remedy equal protection violations by the councils. 9 7 Accordingly, federal courts administering the Indian Civil Rights Act 9 8 before
Santa Clara99 held that under the Act the tribal courts, while they did not
have to adhere to every procedural due process requirement to which
the states are subject under the fourteenth amendment, did have to furnish certain basic elements of due process, such as providing adequate
notice and fair and impartial hearings. 1 0 0 In similar fashion the federal
courts under the Act held the tribal councils to a standard of equal protection tempered by tribal values and resources. 10 1
Another indication of the quality of justice in tribal courts comes
from the state courts' treatment of tribal judgments. Only two states,
10 2
and those only to a limited degree, recognize tribal court judgments.
93. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 164.
94. Id. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.6 (1984); see also id. §§ 11.6C-.6CA.
95. AILTP, supra note 31, at 75. See also Recent Developments, 46 WASH. L. REV. 541, 546
(1971).
96. AILTP, supra note 31, at 75.
97. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
The tribal courts have also failed after Santa Clara to restrain the tribal councils. See supra
text accompanying note 58.
98. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
99. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
100. See, e.g., Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir.
1974); cf National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 560 F. Supp. 213 (D. Mont.),
rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985). The right to a fair and
impartial hearing is sustained when there is blatant bias on the part of the judge. See, e.g.,
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). A serious bias against non-Indians discovered in
tribal courts was that Indian judges consider non-Indians a source of revenue for the
courts, and so fine them heavily. AILTP, supra note 31, at 79.
101. See, e.g., Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506
F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974).
102. Those states are New Mexico and Arizona. AILTP, supra note 31, at 80. In Jim v.
CIT Financial Services Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975), which concerned an
attempted repossession of an auto on the Navajo reservation by a non-Indian creditor, the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that the Navajo Nation was a territory for the purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), the enabling statute for the full faith and credit clause, and
that therefore, on remand, the district court was to determine whether Navajo law was to
apply to the sales contract. The case thus concerned choice of law more than recognition
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If Indian courts could consistently be held to fundamental constitutional
standards, even those provided by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 3 and
they maintained records of their proceedings, states would have little
rational basis for refusing to recognize tribal court judgments. 1° 4 In
turn, recognition of tribal judgments by state courts would effectively
prevent parties from fleeing or removing property from the reservation
to escape execution of tribal court judgments. This would foster the
authority of tribal courts, 10 5 and so satisfy the Santa Clara106 policy mandate of strengthening tribal autonomy. Instead, Santa Clara, by denying
a federal remedy other than the habeas writ under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 10 7 and thereby severely limiting the effectiveness of the Act
as a means of forcing tribes to meet some constitutional standard of due
process and equal protection, left to the tribes the problem of attaining
state court recognition. The tribes have been unable to do so. The
Court's decision, therefore, works against the objective of fostering tribal governmental autonomy which is ironic, because the Court found
that objective to be determinative in its reading of the congressional in10 8
tent behind the Act.

IV.

THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTs ACT AND SANTA CLARA
PUEBLO V. MARTINEZ

A.

Purpose and History of the Act

In April, 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 9 to
remedy tribal abuses of judicial and legislative power in denying consti0
tutional-type rights to persons subject to tribal jurisdiction. 10
The Act
imposes constitutional-type restrictions on the functioning of tribal govofjudgments. Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that a Navajo will admitted
to probate in a tribal court should be given the same force and effect as a will originally
probated in an Arizona state court. In re Lynch's Estate, 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199
(1962). See also Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855) (Cherokee Nation's letters
of appointment for testamentary purposes entitled to full faith and credit).
103. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982).
104. AILTP, supra note 31, at 31.
105. Id. at 30.
106. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Commentators have called for amending 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to
specifically include Indian tribes among those governments to whom full faith and credit
should be given. Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Creditfor Indian Tribes,
7 N.M. L. REV. 133, 145 (1977). See AIPRC, supra note 13, at 19.
107. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982).
108. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62.
109. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982).
110. See generally S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967); Hearingson the Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, S. 961-68 and S.J. Res. 40, Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965); Hearingson the
Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 234-45 (1962); 87th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 285-86 (1963); 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 511-12 (1963); 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 4, at 815 (1964); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONsTrrrUONA. RIGHTS OF SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., CoNsTrrrUTONA. RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN (Comm. Print 1965); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE

88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
(Comm. Print 1964).

COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY,
INDIAN

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN
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ernment, including the courts. " 'I The most important provision of the
Act for the purpose of this article states that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall... deny to any person within its
any person of
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or ' deprive
12
liberty or property without due process of law." "
The legislative history of the Act reveals that it deliberately extends
equal protection and due process rights to any person, including nonIndians, within the jurisdiction of the tribe. United States Senator Ervin,
the Act's sponsor, originally proposed that the full constitutional protection of the Bill of Rights be granted to anyone, Indian or non-Indian,
who came before a tribal court.' 1 The Department of the Interior responded with an alternative version of the bill which provided only certain constitutional-type rights, to be enumerated by statute, and only to
members of the tribes." 4 The Department asserted that granting the
complete protection of the Bill of Rights to anyone who came before a
tribal court would disrupt tribal life, especially if non-Indians used the
equal protection right to claim the benefits of tribal membership.' 15 In
drafting the final version of the Act, Senator Ervin incorporated the Interior Department's approach of granting only select constitutional-type
rights. The final version, nevertheless, continued to guarantee equal
protection and due process to any person within the tribe's jurisdiction,
111. The Act provides:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months
or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws
or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).

112. Id § 1302(8).
113. Hearings on S. 961-968 and S.J Res. 40 before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of
the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
114. Id at 318.
115. Burnett, An HistoricalAnalysis of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 9 HARV.J. ON LEGIs.
557, 591 (1972).
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including non-Indians as well as Indians. 116 Some time after the passage of the Act, the Pueblo tribe, in Senate hearings, expressed concern
about the way the courts were applying the Act, and in particular, how
non-Indians living in the Pueblo communities had utilized the equal
protection right to gain the full benefits of tribal membership." 17 In response, Senator Ervin introduced an amendment to the Act which restricted the meaning of "any person" in the Act to "American Indian,"
thereby denying non-Indians on reservations the guarantee of equal
protection of tribal laws.'18 Ervin himself offered no support for the
amendment, which he felt went against the spirit of his bill, and it died
under advisement in the Senate. 1 9
B. Applications of the Act Before Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
The Act on its face provides no injunctive or declaratory remedy by
which to enforce the rights it enumerates. Section 1303, however, does
furnish habeas corpus relief. 120 Even though the Act provides no explicit remedy other than the habeas writ, until Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,121 most federal courts found an implied right of action under the
22
Act and granted injunctive or declaratory relief accordingly.'
Concern, however, about the federal policies of fostering tribal selfgovernment and cultural autonomy divided federal courts on the question of what standard of constitutional protection is provided by the
constitutional-type rights of the Act. Some courts, denying the importance of Indian values, held the tribes and their courts to the constitutional standards of the federal courts themselves.' 2 3 Another held that
the Act did not necessarily incorporate the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, holding instead that the actions of tribal governments
must be measured "in light of tribal practice" and that "essential fairness in the tribal context, not procedural punctiliousness, is the stan24
dard against which the disputed actions must be measured.'
Variations from the standards of federal law were sanctioned in ques116. Id. at 602. See also Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
49th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1966).
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AMERICAN INDIANS,

117.

Hearings on S. 211 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the

Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1969).
118. Burnett, supra note 115, at 614.
119. Id.at 615.
120. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person in a
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
Tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
121. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
122. See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 933 (10th Cir.
1975); Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1234 (4th Cir.
1974);Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 n.5 (9th Cir. 1973);
Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F.2d 698, 700 (8th Cir. 1972).
123. E.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding Indians to the
federal "one-man, one-vote" doctrine); accord, White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311
(8th Cir. 1973); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D.C. Ariz. 1969).
124. McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1974).
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tions involving election district apportionment t2 5 and eligibility to vote
126
in tribal elections.
In an attempt to further the congressional goal of preserving tribal
culture by permitting the tribal government to resolve tribal disputes
and make tribal policy, before they would grant relief under the Act,
most federal courts prior to Santa Clara insisted upon a showing by the
plaintiff that he had exhausted all tribal remedies. 12 7 Premised on the
idea that Indian governments themselves should be given every possible
opportunity to meet the mandates of the Indian Civil Rights Act, the
exhaustion practice in essence turned federal district courts into appellate courts for the tribal courts.
C.

The Supreme Court's Reading of the Act in Santa Clara

Santa Clara was a suit brought in federal court by a female tribe
member and her daughter against her tribe and its governor. Martinez
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of a tribal
ordinance which denies membership in the tribe to children of female
members who marry outside the tribe, while extending membership to
children of male tribe members who marry outside the tribe. Martinez
and her daughter claimed that the rule discriminates on the basis of sex
and ancestry, in violation of the equal protection provision of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. 1 28 The issue in the case was whether, under the Act, a
federal court could pass on the validity of such a tribal ordinance when
the Act itself does not expressly authorize civil actions for declaratory or
injunctive relief in the enforcement of its substantive provisions.
The Court first noted that the inherent sovereignty of the tribes and
their power to make law on intratribal affairs was subject to congressional authority "to limit, modify, or eliminate the powers of local selfgovernment which the tribes otherwise possess,"' 12 9 and that the Indian
Civil Rights Act is an exercise of such authority. 130 The Court then observed that Indian tribes possess the common law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers. 1 ' Accordingly, the Court
held that, because a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but
must be express, and because the Act does not expressly subject tribes
to the jurisdiction of federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief, such suits against tribes under the Act are barred by the
32
tribe's sovereign immunity.'
125. Daly, 483 F.2d at 700.
126. Wounded Head v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975).
127. See, e.g., St. Mark's v. Chippewa-Cree Tribe, 545 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1976); Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Driving Hawk, 534 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1976) (exhaustion required only if plaintiff
cannot receive a fair hearing from the tribal council); Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724 (8th
Cir. 1975) (same).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982). See supra note 111.
129. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 56 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)).
130. Id at 57.
131. Id at 58.
132. Id.at 58-59.
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A more difficult issue was whether tribal officers, not protected by
the tribe's immunity, could be subject to a cause of action implicit in the
terms of the Act. Holding that they could not, the Court first asserted
that providing a federal forum for issues arising under section 1302
would interfere with tribal autonomy, undermining the authority of tribal courts and thereby infringing upon the right of Indians to govern
themselves.13 3 The Court then turned to the factors identified in Cort v.
Ash, 13 4 to determine whether a cause of action is implicit in the Act, if
not expressly provided.
The Court first acknowledged that a central purpose of the Act was
to secure constitutional-type rights for individual Indians, and that the
respondents were members of the class intended to benefit from the
Act. 13 5 The Court decided, however, that inferring a private cause of
action was not necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Act and that both
the statutory scheme and legislative history suggest that the failure to
establish a federal remedy other than habeas corpus was deliberate on
136
the part of Congress.
The Court then identified two competing purposes of the Act:
strengthening the legal position of individual tribal members (the Court
made no mention of non-Indians) against the tribe, and promoting a
federal policy of furthering Indian self-government by avoiding undue
interference with it. 13 7 The Court found a commitment to furthering
tribal self-government in Congress' selective incorporation of constitutional safeguards into the final version of the Act, indicating a concern
for "the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments."' 3 8 Creating a federal cause of action to enforce the rights set
forth in the Act, while perhaps "useful ...in securing compliance [with
the Act], plainly would be at odds with the Congressional goal of pro' l 9
tecting tribal self-government."
Furthermore, the Court held, it was not necessary to imply a federal
remedy, in addition to habeas corpus relief, to give effect to Congress'
objective of extending constitutional norms to the tribes because tribal
forums are available. The Court noted that tribal courts have long been
recognized as "appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indi140
ans and non-Indians."
The legislative history of the Act also supported the Court's deci133. Id at 59.
134. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The four factors involve first, whether the plaintiff is within
the class of persons to be protected by the statute; second, whether there is an indication
of legislative intent either creating or denying a remedy; third, whether it would be consistent with the underlying legislative purpose to imply a remedy; and fourth, whether the
claim is one traditionally relegated to state or tribal law. Id at 78.
135. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 61.
136. Id
137. Id at 62.
138. Id
139. Id at 64.
140. Id at 65.
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sion not to find a private right of action in the Act. By rejecting the
version of the Act which provided for de novo federal review of tribal
court criminal convictions, and instead settling on the habeas remedy,
Congress opted for a less intrusive review mechanism. 14 1 For similar
reasons, said the Court, Congress rejected those versions of the Act
which would have required review by the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Interior of alleged civil violations of the Act.1 42 In short,
congressional rejection of proposals that would have authorized causes
of action other than petitions for habeas corpus persuaded the Court
that Congress intended to create only the limited review provided ex143
pressly by the habeas corpus remedy.
As a final matter, the Court noted the cultural difference between
federal jurisprudence and tribal tradition, and surmised that Congress
may have limited the federal remedies because "Congress may also have
considered that resolution of statutory issues under § 1302, and particularly those issues likely to arise in a civil context, will frequently depend
on questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be
in a better position to evaluate than federal courts." 14 4 The Court, thus,
decided that a federal remedy to enforce the statutory prohibitions of
the Act, at least in a civil context, might interfere with a tribe's ability to
maintain its political and cultural integrity. 145 For all of the above reasons, the Supreme Court held that the Indian Civil Rights Act does not
impliedly authorize actions in federal court for declaratory or injunctive
relief against either the tribe or its officers.
Justice White dissented. He stated that the only declared purpose
of the Act is "to insure that the American Indian is afforded the broad
constitutional rights secured to other Americans."' 46 Implicit in this
purpose, he asserted, was an authorization to bring civil actions in federal court against tribal officials for declaratory and injunctive relief to
14 7
enforce the provisions of the Act.
D.

Federal Decisions Subsequent to Santa Clara

Despite its broad holding, the facts of Santa Clara, construed narrowly, raise the question of whether the case can be distinguished when
non-Indian parties are involved, since in such litigation the matters disputed are not intratribal and rarely concern tribal custom. Perhaps, in
light of the limited nature of tribal sovereignty when non-Indians are
concerned, 148 Santa Clara can be read to permit federal injunctive and
declaratory relief for non-Indians under the Act. The obvious problem
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at
at
at

67.
68.
70.
71.
72.
72 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 6

(1967)).
147. Id at 74 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969)).
148. See supra notes 20 through 30 and accompanying text.
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with such a reading is that it goes against the Act's legislative intent of
providing the rights of the Act to Indian and non-Indian alike in the
tribal courts. This has not stopped some federal courts, however, from
distinguishing Santa Clara in such a limiting fashion.
Since Santa Clara, federal courts have been in dispute about the application of the decision to non-Indians. The general tenor of some
recent decisions has been disbelief that the Supreme Court, by denying
an effective federal remedy under the Act, intended to allow non-Indian
American citizens to suffer denials of the constitutional-type rights of
the Act in their civil dealings with the tribes. The present situation is
ironic. The Indian Civil Rights Act, intended primarily to provide constitutional-type rights to individual Indians, but subsequently interpreted by the Supreme Court to provide no federal injunctive or
declaratory remedies to enforce such statutory rights, is now read by
some courts to grant such remedies to non-Indians, but not Indians.
All post-Santa Clara decisions concerning the rights of individual Indians under the Indian Civil Rights Act have denied the Indians a federal remedy. The Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, are in
agreement on the question. In Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 1 4 9 an Indian who
was a tribal member but whose name was kept from the tribe's voting list
sued tribal officers under section 1985 of Title 42 of the United States
Code, and under the Indian Civil Rights Act, alleging that tribal officials
had deprived him of his right, as determined by a tribal court and a
council resolution, to have his name put on the ballot. The court held
that the plaintiff had no cause of action under section 1985, and that
even though he had a claim under the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Act
provided no federal remedy. However, the court expressed its frustration with the Santa Clara decision, noting that Shortbull's lack of federal
remedy defeats the purpose of the Indian Civil Rights Act, which is to
protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal
governments. The court also questioned whether rendering meaningless the rights afforded by the Act was justified on the grounds of maintaining tribal autonomy.' 50
The same complaint is echoed in those post-Santa Clara cases concerning the rights of non-Indians under the Act. The most frequently
cited post-Santa Clara decision denying non-Indians a federal remedy
under the Indian Civil Rights Act is Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe. 15 ' In Trans-Canada, the plaintiff non-Indian, a
149. 677 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982).
150. Id. at 650. See also Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 642 F.2d 276 (9th Cir.
1981) (no federal remedy under the Act available to individual Indian alleging that tribe
had deprived him of tribal office in violation of tribal statutes); Bruette v. Knope, 554 F.
Supp. 301 (E.D. Wisc. 1983) (In civil rights complaint by individual Indians against reservation police officers, sovereign immunity extends to officers acting in their official capacity and so bars suit against them under the Act.); Toineeta v. Andrus, 503 F. Supp. 605
(W.D.N.C. 1980) (In dispute over possessory right to tribal land, plaintiff Indian cannot
bypass Santa Clara by suing individual tribal officers in place of the tribe and bringing the
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3)).
151. 634 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1980).
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developer of fee land within reservation boundaries, refused to comply
with a tribal business licensing ordinance. The tribal court enjoined the
developer's construction activities in order to compel compliance with
the ordinance. The plaintiff, in turn, sued the tribe in federal court,
seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance and alleging jurisdiction under, and violations of, the Indian Civil Rights Act. In
particular, he claimed due process and equal protection rights of tribal
law. The court cited Santa Clara in holding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that because the Act did not provide
the plaintiff with a remedy other than habeas corpus, the Act did not, in
152
this case, furnish the court with federal jurisdiction.
The United States District Court of Montana expressed dissatisfaction with this Ninth Circuit holding, but grudgingly followed it in R.J.
Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority. 1 53 In R.J. Williams, the
plaintiff non-Indian construction company entered into a contract with
the defendant tribal housing authority. A dispute arose, and the tribal
court, without notice or a hearing, ordered the attachment of the plaintiff's property on the reservation. Furthermore, by tribal statute, the tribal court did not have the jurisdiction which it exercised over the
plaintiff. The district court held that the tribal court-ordered seizure of
the property violated the plaintiffs right to due process under the Indian Civil Rights Act. 154 The district court granted the plaintiff injunctive relief and damages for conversion against the tribal housing
authority which had a waiver-of-immunity clause in its charter of incorporation. The injunction restrained the authority from selling what had
been attached and from pursuing any further action in tribal court.
The district court also held, however, that it could not grant the
plaintiff relief in the form of damages against the tribe itself because the
Indian Civil Rights Act did not provide the court with jurisdiction over
the tribal court or its officers.' 5 5 The court, in frustration, said that
[t]his case illustrates the absurd results that the broad rule of
[Santa Clara] can cause. The... tribal code states that the tribal
courts shall have no jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Tribal
Court nonetheless exercised jurisdiction over plaintiffs who are
non-Indians. The Tribal Court next ordered plaintiffs' property attached, allegedly in clear violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. Plaintiffs, however, have no remedy in federal court
156
to enforce their statutory right to due process.
The court then considered distinguishing the tribal sovereignty concerns of Santa Clara by noting that in the instant case the plaintiff was a
non-Indian, that the dispute was one of contract law, and not tribal law,
and that the plaintiff had no forum. 157 It acknowledged the Tenth Cir152. Id. at 476.
153. 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981), rev'd, 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985).
154. Id at 939.
155. Id at 938-39.
156. Id at 939.
157. Id at 939-40.
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cuit decision in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes,' 5 8
which had utilized similar distinctions to avoid the Santa Clara ruling.
Nonetheless, the court felt that it had to defer to its own circuit's Trans15 9
Canada decision, and denied the plaintiffs any further remedy.
Other courts have not felt so restrained by the Santa Clara interpretation of the Act and have provided federal remedies to non-Indians
under the Act, or at least implied that such remedies are available to
non-Indians. In United States v. Clifford, 160 an action for declaratory relief, the convicted non-Indian plaintiff moved to suppress evidence
seized at his arrest by tribal police on the reservation. The Eighth Circuit held that, even though there was no search and seizure violation in
the given case, the plaintiff had a claim under the Indian Civil Rights
Act. 16 1 The court used the Act to hold tribal officers to constitutional
standards of evidence-gathering. The case implies that a violation by
tribal officers of certain of a non-Indian's rights under the Act could
entitle the non-Indian to a new trial in federal court if the plaintiff had
been convicted in tribal court.
In more evident conflict with Santa Clara is the Tenth Circuit's decision in Dy Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes.' 6 2 The Dry
Creek decision, in direct contradiction of the Ninth Circuit's Trans-Canada
ruling, distinguished Santa Clara on both factual and policy grounds. In
Dry Creek, the plaintiffs were a non-Indian corporation and its owners,
located on fee land within reservation boundaries. The tribal council
ordered the blocking of the plaintiffs' access road. The plaintiffs sought
a remedy in tribal court but were denied access to it, because of personal
hostility from certain council members. They then sought injunctive relief in federal court, alleging that their personal and property rights
under the Indian Civil Rights Act had been violated. The district court
deferred to Santa Clara and denied jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, distinguishing Santa Clara on the basis
that Dry Creek did not involve a stricdy intratribal matter, that non-Indians were involved, and that no tribal forum was available. The court
held that the plaintiffs had to be afforded a remedy and, thus, remanded
163
the case to the district court.
The Dry Creek approach admittedly provides an effective federal
158.

9 80

623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1

), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981). See infra note 162

and accompanying text.

159. The limited success that the plaintiffs enjoyed with respect to the claims against
the Indian housing authority was short lived. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed on the
grounds that the district court had improperly decided whether the housing authority was
under tribal court jurisdiction, when the question should have been decided by the tribal
court itself. 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Snow v. Quinault Indian Nation, 709
F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1983) (Indian tribe immune from suit in federal court by nonIndian plaintift),cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
160. 664 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1981).
161. It at 1091 n.3. The court found the claim justified under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2).
See also United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1981).
162. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
163. Dry Creek, 623 F.2d at 685. See also Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe, 673 F.2d
315, 319 (10th Cir. 1982) (non-Indian construction company's contract damage claim

782

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3 & 4

remedy for non-Indians under the Act, at least in the situation where a
tribal government denies the non-Indian equal protection by denying
him access to the tribal forum. The decision is also facially consistent
with Santa Clara, which did not consider the treatment of non-Indians
under the Act, and did not reach the question of whether tribal sovereignty merits less respect when non-Indians raise a claim under the Act
which the tribal court refuses to hear.' 64
The numerous cases filed under the Act by Indians before Santa
Clara, however, indicate that Indians also suffer the same type of due
process and equal protection violations in tribal courts as non-Indians. 16 5 Indeed, an important motive behind the passage of the Act was
to remedy such violations. 1 6 6 While the rights of non-Indians in tribal
courts is of primary concern, the similar plight of Indian litigants, as
expressed at the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act itself, cannot be
ignored. Accordingly, Santa Clara should not be read in such a way as to
grant non-Indians, but not Indians, the rights provided by the Act. An
obvious solution to the problem would be for Congress to override
Santa Claraby amending the Act to explicitly provide those federal remedies which the Supreme Court found lacking. A more realistic alternative, however, since it would not be in direct conflict with Santa Clara and
would effectuate the purposes of the Act, is the appellate solution proposed in the next section.
V.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL

Tribal courts frequently have jurisdiction over non-Indians involved
in civil litigation arising on the reservation.1 67 In the tribal courts nonIndian and Indian litigants can suffer denials of due process of law.
These litigants suffer such denials even when measured by constitutional standards tempered by an awareness of the tribal context, as done
by numerous pre-Santa Clara cases decided under the Act. 16 8 Litigants
are also often denied equal protection of the laws by tribal councils, as
against tribe did "not rise to the level of constitutional deprivation to be redressed under
the ICRA," implying that a more serious deprivation would so state a claim).
164. The Tenth Circuit has recently emphasized that where a non-Indian plaintiff has
not first attempted to pursue a remedy in a tribal forum, the Dry Creek rule does not apply.
White v. Pueblo of SanJuan, 728 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1984). Seealso EleventhAnnual Tenth
Circuit Survey: 1983-1984, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 59, 76-77 (1985).
165. See generally AILTP, supra note 31, at 24-29.
166. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
167. Federal courts have criminal jurisdiction over the reservations. See Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARiz. L. REV.
503, 557 n.281 (1976). The General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982), confers on
federal courts jurisdiction over Indians who victimize non-Indians in violations of federal
enclave law. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982), grants to federal courts
jurisdiction over Indians who commit enumerated crimes on the reservation, regardless of
the race of the victim, and regardless of whether the Indian has already been punished
under tribal law. The final major federal intrusion into tribal criminal jurisdiction over
member Indians is the Indian Civil Rights Act itself, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982), which
limits the sentencing power of tribal courts, and is enforceable by § 1303, the right to the
writ of habeas corpus.
168. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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measured by a similar tempered standard, and cannot depend on tribal
courts to remedy such violations. 16 9
To rectify this situation, in 1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 170 which guarantees constitutional-type rights, including
due process and equal protection, to all Indians and non-Indians who
come before tribal courts. The Supreme Court, however, in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 17 1 held that Congress intended no federal remedy
other than habeas corpus for violations of the rights enumerated in the
Act. This weakened the Act as a means of imposing constitutional-type
restrictions on tribal courts. Identifying two purposes behind the Act,
protecting the legal interests of individuals as against tribal governments, and furthering tribal government by avoiding federal interference, the Court in essence decided that Congress had intended to
promote the former interest only to the extent that it did not impinge
2
upon the latter.17
In reaction to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act, the
Tenth Circuit in Dry Creek173 read the Santa Clara decision literally and
held that the non-Indian plaintiffs who were denied access to the tribal
forum had a federal cause of action under the Act. 174 However, Dry
Creek does not provide a satisfactory solution to violations of constitutional-type rights suffered by non-Indians in tribal courts. First, the decision grants a federal remedy under the Act only in the situation where
the tribe has denied a non-Indian access to the tribal forum. Second,
even limiting the federal remedy for non-Indians under the Act to such a
situation necessarily misreads the congressional intent behind the Act.
Congress by no means intended to provide only non-Indians, but not
Indians, the rights enumerated in the Act. 17 5 Dry Creek is consistent with
the Supreme Court's mandate to respect tribal sovereignty in intratribal
disputes, but is inconsistent with the intent of the Act. The ideal solution to the problem of the deprivation of tribal litigants' rights should
reconcile these apparently conflicting values of tribal sovereignty in intratribal matters, and the individual rights of both Indians and nonIndians.
The following solution is therefore proposed. The Indian Civil
Rights Act should be amended to permit appeal to federal district
courts, in both civil and criminal matters, by anyone subject to the jurisdiction of a tribal court who makes a primafacie showing of a deprivation
by the tribal court of any right bestowed by the Act. In order to foster
tribal self-government, this federal appeal should be available only after
169. See supra notes 10, 58-59 and 97; see also Olney Runs After v. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, 437 F. Supp. 1035 (D.S.D. 1977); White v. Tribal Council, Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians, 383 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1974).

170. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
171. 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
172. Id at 64.
173. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
174. Id at 685.
175. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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exhaustion of tribal remedies.' 76 The rights of due process and equal
protection, as furnished by the Act, should be interpreted on federal
appeal as interpreted by federal courts previous to Santa Clara, and not
according to the strict procedural requirements of federal case law, but
rather by a lower standard of fundamental fairness which takes into ac177
count the needs and customs of the tribes.
This federal appellate solution would protect the rights of the Act
by means similar to taking an appeal on a constitutional question from a
federal Article I court. It would be consistent with the predominant legislative purpose behind the Act of providing constitutional-type protections to anyone who comes before a tribal court. 178 It is, furthermore,
only minimally inconsistent with the other congressional objective of the
Act, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in Santa Clara, of fostering
respect for tribal sovereignty and self-government. 179 The requirements of an exhaustion of tribal remedies and interpretation of the
equal protection and due process rights with an eye to tribal needs and
capabilities should lessen the intrusion on tribal sovereignty in even
strictly intratribal disputes. Also, federal enforcement of the constitutional-type requirements of the Act should promote the recognition of
tribal judgments by the states, which in turn should foster the authority
of tribal government by preventing the flight from reservations, which
presently occurs, to escape execution of tribal judgments. 180
Nor is the proposed federal appellate solution inconsistent with
other contemporary aspects of federal Indian law and policy, as depicted
previously in this article. The current state of tribal sovereignty is that it
is subject to the greater sovereignty of the United States. 181 By virtue of
their dependent status the tribes have lost whatever aspects of their sovereignty are inconsistent with federal interests, which has historically
meant that the tribes have lost most of their sovereignty where relations
between Indians and non-Indians were concerned. Tribal sovereignty is
not limited to protecting their self-government and controlling strictly
82
intratribal matters. 1
In accord with this limited tribal sovereignty, federal criminal jurisdiction has been extended to serious crimes committed between Indians
on the reservation,1 8 3 and, more important, to deny tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation. 1 8 4 This latter intrusion
176. See AIPRC, supra note 13, at 19, for an identical proposal.
177. The proposal in essence entails a return to the attitude of those federal courts that
interpreted the Indian Civil Rights Act before Santa Clara: the actions of tribal courts
should be measured in light of tribal practice and "essential fairness in the tribal context,"
is the standard against which tribal actions should be measured. See supra notes 101, 12428 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
179. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62.
180. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.

182. Id.
183. See supra note 167.

184. Id
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into tribal sovereignty resulted from the overriding federal interest in
protecting non-Indians from "unwarranted" deprivations of their liberty.' 8 5 It is a short step from this rationale, and consistent with the
truly limited state of tribal sovereignty, to assert the federal interest in
protecting non-Indians from "unwarranted" deprivations of their property. If, out of respect for whatever is left of tribal sovereignty, tribal
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians cannot be denied, then federal interests would be best protected by permitting a federal appeal to vindicate
the rights granted by the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Admittedly, permitting a federal district court, in a case involving
strictly intratribal litigation, to find that a tribal court violated an Indian
party's rights under the Act, and then to remand the matter to the tribal
court, would represent an intrusion on that intratribal aspect of tribal
sovereignty which federal courts have traditionally respected. Under the
amended Act, such an intrusion on the mechanics of tribal government
would be unavoidable, but its impact would be limited. A federal appeal
would not harm those concerns underlying the policy of preserving tribal sovereignty, such as the protection of tribal culture.186 The appeal
right cannot increase the influence of the states on the reservation, nor
significantly affect tribal culture, since tribal courts themselves are not
an Indian cultural product but a non-Indian imposition on the tribes.
Traditional dispute resolution, with which most Indians remain content,
and which operates mainly outside of court, should continue
unimpaired. Only those Indians who are dissatisfied with the traditional
informality, and want the rights which the Act gives them, will challenge
the traditional method.
The proposed federal appellate solution is therefore also consistent
with the limited nature of tribal sovereignty currently reflected in tribal
governments and courts. While, as a matter of case law, inherent tribal
sovereignty may be an underpinning of tribal government and
courts,'

87

as a matter of fact the exercise of tribal power is subject to

such a great degree of federal influence that tribal governments and
courts are effectively federal instrumentalities. 18 8 Most tribal governments formed under the Indian Reorganization Act remain subject in
numerous ways to the control of the Secretary of the Interior,189 and are
heavily dependent upon federal funding, as are most tribal courts. The
truly limited sovereignty manifest in tribal governments and courts
should not bar the proposed compromise solution of protecting tribal
court litigants by imposition of the constitutional-type rights of the Indian Civil Rights Act,'90 and enforcing those rights by an effective fed185. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978).
186. See Santa Clara,436 U.S. at 71-72 (injunctive and declaratory relief under the Act is
undesirable because of the threat to a tribe's ability to "maintain itself as a culturally...
distinct entity.").
187. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 31-56 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
190. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
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eral remedy.
A final reason to amend the Indian Civil Rights Act is that it would
be in the best economic interest of the tribes themselves to ensure nonIndians the constitutional-type rights of the Act. The horrifying poverty
and underdevelopment of the reservations are undeniable.19 The stark
contrast in the economic conditions of reservations and adjoining communities startles even the casual observer. The immediate cause of the
economic plight of the tribes is the dearth of private capital invested on
the reservations. 19 2 The lack of private development of the reservation
stems primarily from the lack of an awareness of its possibility on the
part of the tribes themselves because of their present and historical reliance on federal "welfare" outlays. 193 This dependency, in turn, is a
product of the strict federal supervision of the development of tribal
natural resources stemming from the federal trust responsibility for the
94
tribes.'
To ensure tribal autonomy through economic self-sufficiency, the
tribes must begin to make their own investment decisions about their
own resources. 19 5 Two profound changes must occur to bring about
this state of affairs. First, the federal trust responsibility must be severely curtailed, to force upon the tribes the responsibility for the investment of their undeniably bountiful resources. 19 6 Then, assuming a
situation in which the tribes do have access to their own resources which
could serve as collateral for an infusion of private, non-Indian capital,
the tribes must then lure such investment by providing a legal environment with far fewer risks than now face non-Indian businessmen in their
dealings with Indians. The tribes at present have little incentive to furnish non-Indian investors with a legal process subject to constitutional
restrictions because the Secretary of the Interior, not the tribes, makes
the ultimate investment decisions concerning tribal resources. 19 7 The
tribes feel unaccountable, and so the spirit of entrepreneurship which
characterizes American economic life is missing among Indians. As a
result of this lack of entrepreneurial spirit, non-Indians, as well as Indi191. See generally AIPRC, supra note 13, at 91, 355. The Commission noted that the
small amount of revenue earned on the reservations by Indians inevitably leaks out to the
surrounding nonreservation communities.
192. Id. at 7-8, 307, 358-59.
193. Id at 305-07.
194. id at 7-8, 16, 359. The Commission noted that all tribal income originates from
the sale or lease of trust resources, judgment funds, and interest from investments and
Treasury deposits. All such revenues are considered tribal trust funds.
195. Id at 307.
196. Id at 16. The Commission recommends that whenever the Secretary disapproves
of a tribal initiative in the use of tribal resources, he should have to file a written statement
with the tribe notifying it of the reason for his disapproval and afford the tribe an opportunity for a hearing. For a brief description of the extent of tribal natural resources, see id. at
305.
197. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1982) (authorizes leases of tribal lands for business and
other purposes subject to approval of the Secretary); 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1982) (authorizes
mining leases of tribal lands subject to Secretarial approval); 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982) (authorizes oil and gas leases on tribal lands, subject to Secretarial approval); 25 U.S.C. § 407
(1982) (authorizes timber leases, under regulations of the Secretary).
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ans, are subjected to due process violations in tribal courts, and even
occasional 8intentional denials of equal protection of tribal law by tribal
9
councils.
An obvious means of assuaging the concerns of non-Indian businessmen about falling within tribal court jurisdiction is to amend the
Indian Civil Rights Act to provide the "backstop" of a federal appeal to
protect the constitutional-type rights of due process and equal protection bestowed by the Act. The reluctance of non-Indian creditors to extend credit to Indians when they face the possibility of having to rely on
tribal courts to enforce their contracts is well-documented. After the
Williams v. Lee'9 and Kennerly v. District Court 2°0 decisions denied nonIndian creditors the use of the state courts in which to collect their
debts, the reservations suffered a marked decline in extension of credit
by banks, mortgage companies, car dealers, and other merchants. 2 0 ' Interest rates rose markedly because of the fear of being unable to recover
202
losses in tribal courts due to Indian defaults on payments.
It is apparent that only by guaranteeing to non-Indian businessmen
that they will suffer no worse treatment in tribal than in non-Indian
courts can the tribes gain access to necessary investment capital. The
prospect of an ultimate federal appeal in the case of deprivation of their
property without due process of law should provide the needed reassurance to non-Indian investors.

198. See generally supra notes 57 to 107 and accompanying text.
199. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
200. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
201. See Mudd,Jurisdiction and the Indian Credit Problem: Considerations for a Solution, 33
MONT. L. REV. 307, 310-11 (1972); Schwechten, Epiloquein Spite of the Law: A Social Comment
on the Impact of Kennerly and Crow Tribe, 33 MoNr. L. REV. 317 (1972); see also Schaab,
Indian Industrial Development and the Courts, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 303 (1968) (Congress and

federal courts should consider the impact that the policy of tribal sovereignty has on business relations of Indians).
202. See AILTP, supra note 31, at 85.

